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Some studies have shown that wage inequality in Japan has slightly 
increased since the 1990s (Cabinet Office, 2009; Ota, 2005). There are many 
factors that generate wage inequality, and determine these changing trends. 
Among them, industry type is an important determinant of overall wage inequality. 
As with other countries, Japan’s inter-industry wage differentials have remained 
substantial. Furthermore, some studies have indicated that inter-industry wage 
differentials increased in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s (Gittleman & Wolff, 
1993; Higuchi, 1989; Otake, 1994). 
After the bubble economy collapsed, the Japanese economy was hit by a 
prolonged recession in the 1990s. During this period, many companies started to 
restructure their employment systems. For example, companies adopted the 
merit-based pay system and hired many nonstandard workers, such as temporary 
and part-time workers, who work for low wages. However, companies in different 
industries face different economic environments. The severe economic situation 
might affect the wages of employees in particular industries differently. For 
example, Ota (2010) showed that the electricity, gas, and heat supply industry 
experienced an increase in wage premium during the 1990s. Given the different 
economic environments, we hypothesize that the inter-industry wage structure 
might have changed during the 1990s. 
Substantial inter-industry wage differentials have been observed in many 
industrialized countries including Japan. According to previous studies, wage 
differences between industries are not explained by the competitive labor market 
model, which argues wages should be the same for equivalent workers working in 
equivalent jobs (Dickens & Katz, 1987; Gannon, Plasman, Rycx, & Tojerow, 2007; 
Genrea, Kohn, & Momferatou, 2011; Gittleman & Wolff 1993; Krueger & Summers, 
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1988). In Japan, some previous studies have shown that characteristics of 
industries, such as intensity of international competition and productivity, are 
related to inter-industry wage differentials (Higuchi, 1989; Tachibanaki & Ota, 
1992; Ueshima & Funaba, 1993). 
However, the trend in inter-industry wage differentials during the 1990s in 
Japan has not been thoroughly examined. Studies on inter-industry wage 
differentials considering a variety of workers are relatively scarce due to the lack 
of appropriate data. Almost all previous studies used the Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in Japan. 
Although this is a comprehensive survey on the wage structure, it targets workers 
in establishments with more than five employees and focuses mainly on full-time 
workers.1) 
Additionally, almost all previous studies have focused only on the mean wage 
of each industry, and they have examined only the mean wage differentials 
between industries. However, some recent studies have shown that industry rents 
are not equally distributed to workers within each industry (Kim & Sakamoto, 
2008; Morgan & Tang, 2007). As a result, trends in inter-industry wage 
differentials might vary across wage distribution. 
Using unconditional quantile regression (UQR) analysis and the Employment 
Status Survey which targets both standard and nonstandard workers, this paper 
examines how inter-industry wage differentials changed during the 1990s in 
Japan. We also utilize industry-level variables such as the Herfindahl index (HI) 
to examine whether and in what way inter-industry wage differentials are 
explained by the different economic environments faced by firms in different 
industries. 
This paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing previous studies 
that indicated that the inter-industry wage differentials have been substantial 
and stable in industrialized countries including Japan. Next, we point out the 
theoretical rationale for inter-industry wage differentials, focusing on 
noncompetitive explanations. We address two structural processes of distributing 
wages that are related to inter-industry wage differentials, namely, economic 
segmentation and rent-sharing, and we present our analytical strategies. After we 
explain the data and variables, we analyze the survey data using UQR analysis. 
Then, we summarize, discuss the results, and conclude. 
 
Existence of Inter-Industry Wage Differentials 
Previous studies have shown that inter-industry wage differentials are 
substantial in many industrialized countries. Krueger and Summers (1988) found 
that the dispersion in wages across industries is substantial in the United States. 
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It has also been noted that industrial wage structures have shown remarkable 
stability over time in OECD countries (Gittleman & Wolff, 1993). The fairly stable 
inter-industry wage structure is similar across 22 OECD countries (Genrea et al., 
2011). 
These differentials are not explained by differences in workers’ characteristics 
and working conditions in different industries (Krueger & Summers, 1988). 
Dickens and Katz (1987) demonstrated that, after controlling for a wide range of 
workers’ characteristics and geographic locations, large wage differences across 
industries persist for both union and nonunion workers in the United States. 
Genrea et al. (2011) showed that although both workforce characteristics and 
firm-related characteristics contribute significantly to explain inter-industry wage 
differentials in the euro area, considerable wage differences remain across sectors. 
As in other industrialized countries, there are substantial and relatively 
stable industry wage differentials in Japan. Tachibanaki and Ota (1992) examined 
the wage difference in each industry, utilizing data from the Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure, and they found that the industrial wage structure had remained stable 
from 1978 to 1988. They showed that employees in the finance and insurance 
industry received the highest wages, and employees in the transportation industry, 
the lowest. Ota (2010) also examined industry wage premiums between 1990 and 
2006, utilizing the same data as Tachibanaki and Ota (1992). The author 
demonstrated that, in some industries, such as electricity, gas, and heat supply, 
finance and insurance, or manufacture of chemicals, employees received higher 
wage premiums.  
Although the rank of industry wage premiums hardly changes over time, 
some studies have shown changing trends in inter-industry wage differentials in 
Japan. Previous studies, such as Gittleman and Wolff (1993), Higuchi (1989), and 
Otake (1994), found that Japan showed increases in inter-industry wage 
dispersion during the 1970s and 1980s. Kosai and Ito (2000) found that 
inter-industry wage differentials fluctuated between 1979 and 1998. Ota (2010) 
showed the wage premium of the electricity, gas, and heat supply industry 
increased from 1998 to 2006, whereas that of the finance and insurance industry 
decreased from 1990 to 2006. 
In the next section, we explain the theoretical rationale for inter-industry 
wage differentials.  
 
Theoretical Rationale for Inter-industry Wage Differentials 
As noted in the previous section, many studies have shown that 
inter-industrial wage differentials are substantial and stable in many 
industrialized countries including Japan. These differentials are not wholly 
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explained by differences in workers’ characteristics and working conditions in 
different industries. Why do substantial and stable inter-industrial wage 
differentials exist?  
In economics textbooks, the competitive labor market model argues that 
wages should be the same for equivalent workers working in equivalent jobs 
(Genrea et al., 2011). Empirically, according to the competitive explanation for 
inter-industry wage differentials, these differentials should reflect differences in 
observed and unobserved worker characteristics, such as education and ability, 
across industries (Gittleman & Pierce, 2011). 
However, this holds only partially in the real world. The classical competitive 
theories of wage determination have been empirically challenged by many studies 
(Dickens & Katz, 1987). It has long been noted that there are substantial 
differences in wages across industries for workers with similar characteristics 
doing apparently similar jobs, and these differentials have been found in many 
countries, and they are surprisingly persistent over time (Genrea et al., 2011). 
Against the competitive explanation, many studies have suggested 
noncompetitive explanations for inter-industry wage differentials. These studies 
on persistent inter-industry wage differentials underscore structural aspects of 
the labor market. In accordance with the noncompetitive explanations, we focus on 
two structural processes of distributing wages, which are related to inter-industry 
differentials. The first process is economic segmentation, and the second process is 
rent-sharing.  
Economic Segmentation 
Economic segmentation refers to the capacity of employing organizations 
(typically firms) to prosper in the immediate economic environment and to extract 
rewards from it by exploiting any sort of advantages that may be generated from 
that environment (Baron & Bielby, 1984; Kim & Sakamoto, 2010). Different firms 
face different economic environments. Economic segmentation is a concept that 
refers to the different circumstances that each firm faces. 
From the economic segmentation perspective, the type of industry is 
important because it indicates how firms in each industry deal with the different 
environments in which they do business.2) The type of industry refers to the kinds 
of products firms sell. Each product market has different rules and regulations for 
producing, supplying, and distributing products. These structures are related to 
the earning capacity of firms. 
According to Kalleberg, Wallace, and Althauser (1981), economic 
segmentation is multidimensional. This means that many factors have an impact 
upon firms. Previous studies have focused on variables that can explain 
inter-industry wage differentials, two important ones being market concentration 
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and high productivity. 
Market concentration influences inter-industry wage differentials because 
firms in highly concentrated industries have greater market power and control 
over pricing mechanisms. Consequently, they can pay employees more than firms 
in competitive industries (Kalleberg et al., 1981). For example, only a few 
companies dominate the Japanese market in some industries, such as electricity, 
gas, heat, and water supply and the railroad industries. This situation has been 
caused by state regulations or company reorganization.  
High labor productivity means that the products and services that firms sell 
have high added value. Each company would naturally try to produce and sell 
such products and services, but the value that could be added depends on the 
market structure. One of the reasons for high productivity is capital intensity. 
High capital intensity reflects the use of specialized machinery; thus, firms in 
capital-intensive industries are more productive and efficient than firms with 
relatively high labor costs, and the former are, therefore, able to pay high salaries 
(Genrea et al., 2011; Kalleberg et al., 1981). On the other hand, firms in 
labor-intensive industries, such as retail trade and food service, have to pay huge 
amounts in total labor costs, and therefore, the possibilities for increasing 
productivity are limited. These arguments show that the specific economic 
environments of a product market create advantages or disadvantages for firms in 
different industries. 
Rent-sharing 
The environmental advantages pertaining to each industry impact the extent 
of profits generated, which could be shared by workers. These profits are called 
“industry rent,” and the phenomenon is known as “rent-sharing.” This is the 
second structural process this paper focuses on. Rent-sharing has been observed in 
many periods and countries (Arai, 2003; Genrea et al., 2011; Weeden and Grusky, 
2014). For example, Du Caju, Rycx, and Tojerow (2011) showed that workers earn 
significantly higher wages when employed in more profitable firms. The authors 
claimed that rent sharing is an important mechanism to explain the structure and 
stability of inter-industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector. 
However, a firm’s profits are not automatically distributed to workers. There 
are two considerations with regard to this rent-sharing process. First, a firm’s 
profits are not evenly distributed to all workers, because each worker has different 
worker power. Workers’ power is derived from the attributes of members of the 
labor force, and it increases their ability to obtain valued rewards from work. 
Workers’ power comes from union membership, occupational skills, or tenure with 
specific employers (Kalleberg et al., 1981). 
This paper focuses on workers’ collective power, namely, workers’ bargaining 
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power. This term refers to workers’ ability to obtain the economic surplus 
generated by their firms through collective bargaining processes. In Japan, union 
density varies across industries. Some industries, such as the railroad industry or 
the finance and insurance industry, have high union density. On the other hand, 
union density is very low in the hospitality and food service industry and retail 
trade industry. This means that workers’ bargaining power varies across 
industries. Previous studies have shown that unionization is a significant factor in 
explaining inter-industry wage differentials (Gittleman and Wolff, 1993). 
According to Kim and Sakamoto (2008), reduced unionization rates were the most 
important factors associated with the narrowing of inter-industry wage dispersion 
in the United States. 
However, rent-sharing cannot be completely determined by workers’ 
bargaining power. Ueshima and Funaba (1993) showed that, in Japan, industry 
wage premiums were not explained by differences in union density across 
industries only. The authors suggested that rent-sharing is caused by “fair 
contracts” between employers and employees. This means that employers share 
industry rent with their employees in order to provide incentives to employees. To 
supplement their argument, we note that most unions in Japan are formed within 
each firm, and they do not tend to be antagonistic to their employers. As a result, 
their bargaining power is not so great. Thus, we hypothesize that, although 
differences of union density across industries could partially explain 
inter-industry wage differentials, industry wage premiums could remain after 
controlling for differences of union density across industries.  
The second consideration to note here is selective rent destruction. Morgan 
and Tang (2007) observed that during the period 1983 to 2001, the decline in 
variance of wage premium between industries was relatively higher for those at 
the bottom of the class distribution in the United States. They called this 
phenomenon “selective rent destruction” and explained it as follows: “the working 
class has been disproportionately harmed by basic changes in employment 
relations, both in the norms by which wages are set and in organizational 
employment schemes” (Morgan & Tang, 2007, p. 289). According to Kim and 
Sakamoto (2008), inter-industry wage dispersion increased until the late 1980s, 
but started to decline thereafter. The authors interpreted these findings as 
suggesting that “firms may now be less economically obliged to pass on a portion of 
their rents to broad groups of workers.” This means that a company may instead 
be engaged in more idiosyncratic processes of negotiation with individual workers 
based on micro-level sources of bargaining power (Kim & Sakamoto, 2008, p. 
1082). 
Because of intensified globalization in the economy, Japanese firms face 
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changes similar to those seen in American firms. Consequently, there might be 
selective rent destruction, which would lead to changes in the inter-industry wage 
structure in Japan. Despite the apparent lack of research on this topic in the 
Japanese context, we may hypothesize that there has been selective rent 
destruction given that many Japanese firms in different industries hire 
nonstandard workers whose wages are very low. Additionally, according to Noda 
and Abe (2010), labor share has shown a downward trend since the mid-1990s in 
Japan. These changes might hurt a certain portion of workers and lead to selective 
rent destruction.3) 
Analytical Strategies 
The abovementioned considerations drive us to formulate three analytical 
strategies. First, we examine inter-industry wage differentials focusing on the 
wage distribution instead of only one representative value such as the mean or 
median. Previous studies focused only on the mean wages of different industries, 
but this does not account for the fact that the effect of industry on wage could vary 
across the distribution (Gittleman & Wolff, 1993; Higuchi, 1989; Kozai & Ito, 2000; 
Ota, 2010; Otake, 1994; Tachibanaki & Ota, 1992; Ueshima & Funaba, 1993). We 
focus on quantiles of wages in different industries using the unconditional 
quantile regression (UQR) analysis. 
Second, we consider industry-level variables to examine what factors are 
related to inter-industry wage differentials. We then discuss whether economic 
segmentation and rent-sharing provide an effective explanation for inter-industry 
wage differentials. We also investigate whether the relationship between 
industry-level variables and wages at each quantile changed during the 1990s 
when many firms were hit by severe economic recession. 
Third, we use survey data with detailed industry categories targeting 
nonstandard workers, such as temporary and part-time workers, as well as 
regular full-time workers. Previous studies on inter-industry wage differentials in 
Japan usually used the Basic Survey on Wage Structure that focused only on 
full-time workers. However, it is important to include nonstandard workers in the 
analysis because nonstandard workers have made up a significant proportion of 
workforce since the 1990s. 
In the next section, we explain the analytical model, data, and variables used. 
 
Methodology 
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 
UQR is an analytic approach proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). 
It is an appropriate technique to answer our question for the following reason. 
UQR focuses on the unconditional quantile of an individual, namely, his/her 
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earnings quantile in the overall earnings distribution. This technique reveals how 
working in certain industries increases or decreases wages at different points in 
the wage distribution. Therefore, UQR addresses the manner in which the 
association between industry and wages varies across the wage distribution, 
where covariates help net out spurious associations between industry and wages 
(Fournier & Koske, 2012). 
UQR models are estimated using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression on a transformed dependent variable, the recentered influence function 
(RIF). In a RIF regression, a dependent variable Y is replaced by the recentered 
influence function of the statistic of interest: 𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑦; ν) = ν(𝐹𝑌) + 𝐼𝐹(𝑦; ν) where F 
is distribution. In the case of quantiles, the influence function 𝐼𝐹(𝑌, 𝑄𝜏) is given 
by (τ − 𝐼{𝑌 ≤ 𝑄𝜏})/𝑓𝑌(𝑄𝜏), where 𝐼{∙} is an indicator function, and 𝑓𝑌(∙) is the 
density of the marginal distribution of Y, and 𝑄𝜏 is the population τ quantile of 
the unconditional distribution of Y. As a result, 𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑌, 𝑄𝜏)  is equal to 𝑄𝜏 +
𝐼𝐹(𝑌, 𝑄𝜏) and can be rewritten as 
𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑦;𝑄𝜏) = 𝑄𝜏 +
𝜏−𝐼{𝑌≤𝑄𝜏}
𝑓𝑌(𝑄𝜏)
= 𝑐1,𝜏 ∙ 𝐼{𝑌 ≤ 𝑄𝜏} + 𝑐2,𝜏, 
where 𝑐1,𝜏 = 1/𝑓𝑌(𝑄𝜏) and 𝑐2,𝜏 = 𝑄𝜏 − 𝑐1,𝜏 ∙ (1 − 𝜏). 
Running a linear regression of 𝐼{𝑌 ≤ 𝑄𝜏}  is a distributional regression 
estimated at Y = 𝑄𝜏, using the link function of the linear probability model. The 
RIF is estimated by computing the sample quantile ?̂?𝜏 and estimating the density 
at that point using kernel methods (Firpo et al., 2009). 
Data and Variables 
This study draws on a national cross-sectional survey, the Employment 
Status Survey,4) an official statistical survey of Japan conducted by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications. It is a survey of people over the age of 15 
who live in households selected by a stratified random sampling method. Our data 
are sourced from the 1992 and 2002 surveys. The targeted households numbered 
about 430,000 in 1992 and 440,000 in 2002. 
We focus on the subset of respondents employed by private sector companies. 
We limit our targets to those aged 20 to 59 years in order to prevent the retirement 
system from affecting the results. Our sample population comprises of 151,714 
males and 101,742 females in 1992, and 138,126 males and 107,113 females in 
2002. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of price-adjusted hourly 
wage.5,6) We use industry (34 categories), education (4 categories), firm size (10 
categories), occupation (9 categories), employment status (nonstandard workers), 
and length of tenure as independent variables. The variable of tenure is centered 
by the average. Part-time, temporary, and fixed-term workers are included in the 
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category of nonstandard workers. We analyze the data separately by gender. The 
descriptive statistics of these dependent and independent variables are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Means and S.D.s of Variables 
 
 
We use the Herfindahl index (HI), labor productivity, and union density as 
industry-level variables.7) The HI was sourced from the Japan Industrial 
Productivity (JIP) database 2006 (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, 2006). This index is defined as the sum of the squared market share of 
all firms within the industry. As it is calculated based on the information of 
Japanese domestic market, it represents domestic market concentration. A 
smaller number means a less concentrated market, and a larger number, a more 
concentrated market. As the JIP database offers the data for 1996 and 2001 only, 
we use the 1996 data for our 1992 survey data and the 2001 data for our 2002 
survey data. The measure of labor productivity comes from the Financial 
Statements of Corporations by Industry. This is defined as value added per 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Wage 7.448 0.549 7.379 0.591 6.751 0.547 6.771 0.551
Tenure 13.809 10.190 12.670 11.121 8.002 7.120 7.188 8.039
Junior high school 0.209 0.407 0.135 0.342 0.208 0.406 0.109 0.311
High school 0.525 0.499 0.510 0.500 0.580 0.494 0.546 0.498
Junior college 0.059 0.236 0.097 0.296 0.169 0.375 0.256 0.437
University 0.207 0.405 0.257 0.437 0.043 0.204 0.089 0.285
1-4 0.047 0.212 0.051 0.220 0.084 0.277 0.074 0.261
5-9 0.079 0.270 0.083 0.276 0.107 0.309 0.100 0.301
10-19 0.089 0.285 0.097 0.296 0.112 0.315 0.106 0.308
20-29 0.061 0.240 0.062 0.241 0.067 0.249 0.068 0.252
30-49 0.074 0.262 0.076 0.265 0.083 0.276 0.080 0.271
50-99 0.101 0.302 0.104 0.306 0.113 0.316 0.116 0.321
100-299 0.152 0.359 0.156 0.363 0.155 0.362 0.162 0.368
300-499 0.061 0.240 0.064 0.245 0.054 0.227 0.061 0.240
500-999 0.069 0.253 0.074 0.261 0.053 0.225 0.062 0.241
More than 1000 0.266 0.442 0.232 0.422 0.173 0.378 0.170 0.376
Professionals 0.101 0.302 0.105 0.307 0.112 0.316 0.139 0.346
Managers 0.026 0.158 0.018 0.131 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.024
Clerical workers 0.145 0.352 0.137 0.344 0.348 0.476 0.328 0.470
Sales workers 0.160 0.367 0.169 0.375 0.123 0.329 0.134 0.340
Service workers 0.033 0.180 0.051 0.219 0.099 0.299 0.150 0.357
Drivers and
cation operators
Craft and related
trades workers
Stationary plant and
related operators
Laborers 0.063 0.242 0.068 0.251 0.055 0.228 0.067 0.250
Nonstandard workers 0.038 0.191 0.100 0.300 0.310 0.463 0.486 0.500
Firm
size
Edu-
cation
Male Female
1992 (n=151,714) 2002 (n=138,126) 1992 (n=101,742) 2002 (n=107,113)Variables
0.072 0.003 0.059
0.295
Occu-
pation
0.456 0.260 0.438 0.252 0.434 0.175 0.380
0.083 0.276 0.071 0.256 0.005
0.064 0.003 0.0510.093 0.291 0.123 0.328 0.004
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employee in units of CNY 10,000. Data for union density are taken from the Basic 
Survey on Labour Unions. Union density is defined as the ratio of union members 
to nonunion members in each industry. These industry-level variables are shown 
in Table 2.8) 
 
Table 2. Industry-Level Variables 
 
*1 Data from the Basic Survey on Business Activity in 2002. *2 Data in 2004. 
 
Analyses 
Using the analytical model, data, and variables, we conduct the following two 
analyses. First, we estimate industry wage premiums at several quantiles using 
Industries 1992 2002 1992 2002 1992 2002
Agriculture 18.71 22.10 492 436 1.1 0.5
Forestry 17.82 15.38 419 490 45.7 34.3
Fishery 10.96 11.61 663 536 9.6 6.2
Mining 29.29 26.20 933 1199 34.4 20.7
Construction 1.86 2.02 805 690 19.6 22.7
Manufacture of food and beverage 49.60 33.63 623 611 16.6 13.4
Manufacture of textiles 1.35 1.73 427 439 16.3 14.6
Manufacture of wood, wooden products 3.48 4.26 558 589 10.1 10.0
Manufacture of paper, paper products, pulp 82.66 74.11 693 723 27.0 24.0
Publishing and printing 9.23 8.79 803 813 17.6 23.5
Manufacture of chemicals, petroleum, coal 286.10 433.02 1177 1333 26.2 45.7
Manufacture of ceramics, soil, stone 51.55 55.63 707 731 25.6 19.9
Steel 702.54 812.41 1210 911 52.2 44.4
Manufacture of nonmetallic products 175.58 158.20 892 823 54.2 50.3
Manufacture of basic metals 8.69 10.08 751 690 14.8 13.2
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 34.29 35.13 855 813 28.5 24.6
Manufacture of electric machinery 103.66 114.54 669 717 36.6 78.2
Manufacture of transport equipment 120.74 103.32 812 994 61.5 56.8
Manufacture of precision machinery 17.79 16.08 689 842 39.6 9.1
Manufacture, not elsewhere classified 9.11 8.23 694 697 47.5 16.1
Electricity, gas, steam, water supply 989.80 1098.91 2845 3165 53.4 55.8
Railroad 994.37 1120.53 777 753 86.6 69.1
Transport and storage 24.52 22.00 777 753 33.2 25.8
Information and telecommunications 70.19 133.17 1786 1840 66.8 15.8
Wholesale trade 1.02 1.05 810 738 10.3 7.5
Retail trade 2.04 3.23 454 467 10.3 11.3
Hospitality and food service 3.51 6.15 545 495 10.3 2.6
Financial and insurance 438.80 496.06 1406 *1 1406 *1 58.3 46.4
Real estate 1.11 1.33 1539 1848 4.1 2.8
Services related to the people’s daily lives 1.47 2.58 474 470 18.1 13.4
Entertainment 4.15 8.91 673 576 18.1 7.6
Medical and health 24.52 22.42 388 *2 388 *2 15.4 8.5
Education 13.00 12.88 529 *2 529 *2 35.4 25.0
Service, not elsewhere classified 121.91 136.96 546 542 18.1 13.4
HI Productivity Union density
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UQR analysis. Second, we estimate UQR models including industry-level 
variables instead of dummy variables for industry, and we examine the 
relationship between industry-level variables and wages at each quantile. 
Analysis 1: Industry Wage Premiums at Each Quantile 
First, we examine whether and in what way working in specific industries 
gives workers wage advantages at different points in the wage distribution. We 
estimate the following Model (1): 
 
𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑦;𝑄𝜏) = 𝛽[𝜏]0 + ∑ 𝛽[𝜏]𝑗𝑋
𝑗
𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼[𝜏]𝑘𝐼
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝜀[𝜏]𝑖, 
･･･Model (1) 
where I is the set of dummy variables for industry and X is the set of independent 
variables other than industry. 
We estimate this UQR model of wage separately by gender and the two years, 
1992 and 2002. Using the coefficients of industry dummy variables obtained from 
these models, we calculate industry wage premiums at each quantile, where the 
mean of wage premiums is set to zero in each quantile and each year. Although the 
UQR model can be estimated at any quantile, the wage premiums at quantile 0.1, 
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 are shown in Table 3 (male) and Table 4 (female) because of 
space constraints. 
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Table 3. Industry Wage Premiums at Quantiles (Male) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantile 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Agriculture -0.120 -0.073 -0.048 -0.048 -0.070 -0.114 -0.063 -0.081 -0.042 -0.104
Forestry -0.288 -0.297 -0.235 -0.211 -0.257 0.023 -0.038 -0.059 -0.050 -0.152
Fishery 0.046 -0.104 -0.179 -0.226 -0.320 -0.004 -0.066 -0.113 -0.124 -0.217
Mining 0.133 0.052 0.044 -0.074 -0.114 0.168 0.133 0.175 0.026 -0.133
Construction 0.046 0.016 -0.001 -0.002 0.103 0.043 0.015 -0.034 -0.033 -0.090
Manufacture of food and beverage -0.043 -0.059 -0.076 -0.082 -0.060 -0.055 -0.064 -0.100 -0.083 -0.080
Manufacture of textiles -0.053 -0.071 -0.091 -0.125 -0.184 -0.071 -0.061 -0.173 -0.164 -0.363
Manufacture of wood, wooden products -0.083 -0.095 -0.170 -0.181 -0.128 -0.060 -0.093 -0.178 -0.148 -0.222
Manufacture of paper, paper products, pulp 0.026 0.011 0.019 0.016 -0.019 0.028 0.057 0.062 0.032 -0.092
Publishing and printing -0.038 0.002 0.000 -0.007 0.159 -0.043 -0.033 -0.081 -0.105 -0.230
Manufacture of chemicals, petroleum, coal 0.052 0.072 0.097 0.160 0.215 0.017 0.064 0.168 0.233 0.588
Manufacture of ceramics, soil, stone 0.049 0.008 -0.023 -0.020 -0.085 0.047 0.049 -0.008 -0.017 -0.136
Steel 0.036 0.068 0.099 0.191 0.041 -0.007 0.031 0.092 0.085 -0.123
Manufacture of nonmetallic products 0.093 0.123 0.135 0.107 -0.112 0.038 0.047 0.119 0.072 0.092
Manufacture of basic metals 0.083 0.075 0.056 0.005 -0.006 0.065 0.026 -0.009 -0.059 -0.190
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0.055 0.078 0.079 0.038 -0.039 0.058 0.034 0.054 0.018 -0.122
Manufacture of electric machinery 0.012 0.008 -0.001 0.000 -0.044 0.015 0.005 0.019 0.023 -0.043
Manufacture of transport equipment 0.074 0.095 0.074 0.012 -0.136 0.032 0.040 0.070 0.066 -0.079
Manufacture of precision machinery 0.004 0.020 0.022 0.045 0.086 0.028 0.019 0.022 0.026 -0.069
Manufacture, not elsewhere classified -0.025 -0.018 0.007 -0.005 -0.001 0.041 0.019 0.011 0.005 -0.106
Electricity, gas, steam, water supply 0.055 0.081 0.125 0.204 0.662 0.020 0.055 0.186 0.287 1.317
Railroad 0.005 0.017 -0.015 -0.058 -0.574 -0.012 0.010 0.049 0.118 0.293
Transport and storage 0.091 0.055 0.005 -0.091 -0.135 0.018 -0.036 -0.075 -0.107 -0.189
Information and telecommunications 0.009 0.054 0.106 0.222 -0.150 0.043 0.031 0.018 0.019 -0.063
Wholesale trade 0.030 0.012 -0.011 -0.036 -0.023 0.032 0.014 -0.032 -0.050 -0.132
Retail trade -0.121 -0.120 -0.152 -0.185 -0.220 -0.141 -0.145 -0.206 -0.190 -0.325
Hospitality and food service -0.144 -0.076 -0.077 -0.116 -0.143 -0.135 -0.119 -0.125 -0.131 -0.159
Financial and insurance -0.002 0.006 0.040 0.117 0.532 0.017 0.020 0.053 0.102 0.373
Real estate 0.130 0.135 0.189 0.236 0.502 0.113 0.101 0.185 0.179 0.353
Services related to the people’s daily lives -0.173 -0.114 -0.117 -0.118 -0.129 -0.285 -0.115 -0.111 -0.102 -0.168
Entertainment -0.006 -0.028 -0.010 -0.009 0.059 0.075 -0.009 -0.034 -0.051 -0.005
Medical and health -0.014 -0.005 0.011 0.091 0.318 0.039 0.040 0.066 0.073 0.294
Education 0.061 0.075 0.112 0.181 0.349 -0.055 0.012 0.049 0.074 0.306
Service, not elsewhere classified 0.019 -0.002 -0.015 -0.030 -0.077 0.024 0.020 0.021 0.018 -0.022
20021992
Namie NAGAMATSU 
37 
 
Table 4. Industry Wage Premiums at Quantiles (Female) 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show that electricity, gas, heat, and water supply,  
manufacture of chemicals, petroleum, and coal products, real estate, and finance 
and insurance are industries with higher wage premiums. On the other hand, 
retail trade, services related to the people’s daily lives, manufacture of textiles, 
manufacture of wood and wooden products, fishery, and forestry are industries 
with lower wage premiums. 
Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the following four findings. First, wage premiums 
and penalties at higher quantiles tend to be greater than those at lower quantiles. 
For example, for male workers, the wage premiums of the finance and insurance 
industry at quantile 0.9 were 0.532 in 1992 and 0.373 in 2002, whereas those at 
quantile 0.1 were -0.002 in 1992 and 0.017 in 2002. The wage premiums of 
electricity, gas, heat, and water supply at quantile 0.9 were 0.662 in 1992 and 
1.317 in 2002, and those at quantile 0.1 were 0.055 in 1992 and 0.020 in 2002. This 
means that employees located at the top end of the distribution received higher 
industry wage premiums than those at the bottom end of the distribution. 
Second, industry wage premiums and penalties tended to be greater for male 
workers than for female workers.9) For example, the wage premiums of 
Quantile 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Agriculture -0.285 -0.132 -0.091 -0.067 -0.092 -0.031 -0.158 -0.072 -0.062 -0.026
Forestry -0.963 -0.345 -0.137 -0.051 -0.175 0.036 0.041 0.033 0.039 -0.047
Fishery -0.924 -0.331 -0.104 -0.104 -0.033 -0.029 -0.209 -0.104 -0.240 -0.198
Mining 0.344 0.057 -0.089 -0.056 -0.093 0.038 0.021 0.017 -0.091 -0.076
Construction 0.021 0.012 0.012 -0.025 -0.005 0.002 0.021 0.000 -0.020 -0.089
Manufacture of food and beverage -0.083 -0.068 -0.063 -0.091 -0.122 -0.004 -0.047 -0.041 -0.056 -0.052
Manufacture of textiles -0.207 -0.204 -0.185 -0.183 -0.201 -0.058 -0.178 -0.124 -0.193 -0.198
Manufacture of wood, wooden products 0.077 -0.020 -0.081 -0.105 -0.162 0.014 -0.009 -0.042 -0.104 -0.145
Manufacture of paper, paper products, pulp -0.020 -0.011 -0.027 -0.062 -0.134 0.010 0.008 0.009 -0.009 -0.073
Publishing and printing 0.179 0.056 0.048 0.025 -0.022 0.032 0.065 0.012 -0.016 -0.085
Manufacture of chemicals, petroleum, coal 0.055 0.047 0.053 0.076 0.041 0.028 0.108 0.096 0.189 0.269
Manufacture of ceramics, soil, stone 0.131 0.002 -0.020 -0.061 -0.149 0.011 0.036 0.012 -0.015 -0.052
Steel 0.188 0.117 0.124 0.109 0.037 -0.012 -0.003 0.007 0.052 -0.092
Manufacture of nonmetallic products 0.056 0.109 0.082 0.014 -0.142 -0.025 0.033 0.018 0.034 -0.032
Manufacture of basic metals 0.170 0.116 0.073 0.034 -0.056 0.018 0.044 0.030 0.003 -0.064
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0.158 0.130 0.105 0.067 0.013 0.018 0.049 0.046 0.072 -0.003
Manufacture of electric machinery -0.028 -0.022 -0.005 -0.010 -0.088 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.001
Manufacture of transport equipment 0.077 0.123 0.099 0.100 -0.037 -0.006 0.071 0.046 0.097 0.094
Manufacture of precision machinery 0.155 0.085 0.035 -0.003 -0.075 -0.005 0.005 0.008 0.028 0.009
Manufacture, not elsewhere classified -0.087 -0.028 -0.026 -0.012 -0.041 0.016 -0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.042
Electricity, gas, steam, water supply -0.009 0.066 0.083 0.235 0.559 0.001 0.037 0.061 0.235 0.577
Railroad -0.028 -0.009 0.020 -0.057 0.032 -0.029 -0.030 0.019 0.070 0.286
Transport and storage 0.067 -0.016 -0.037 -0.045 -0.071 0.006 -0.010 -0.024 -0.062 -0.067
Information and telecommunications -0.070 -0.063 -0.003 0.183 0.936 0.014 0.075 0.046 0.107 0.103
Wholesale trade 0.089 0.028 0.018 -0.008 -0.056 0.023 0.022 0.012 0.003 -0.037
Retail trade 0.045 -0.066 -0.100 -0.133 -0.196 -0.009 -0.053 -0.062 -0.102 -0.077
Hospitality and food service 0.162 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.002 -0.035 -0.071 -0.066 -0.067 -0.018
Financial and insurance 0.029 0.017 0.056 0.128 0.327 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.034 0.087
Real estate 0.197 0.150 0.108 0.139 0.171 0.017 0.068 0.038 0.078 0.082
Services related to the people’s daily lives -0.106 -0.110 -0.102 -0.110 -0.114 -0.024 -0.123 -0.093 -0.122 -0.081
Entertainment 0.126 0.134 0.074 0.055 -0.031 0.008 0.073 0.045 0.026 -0.042
Medical and health 0.227 0.076 0.025 0.012 -0.031 0.025 0.099 0.060 0.101 0.062
Education 0.109 -0.002 -0.023 -0.067 0.011 -0.068 -0.030 -0.012 -0.051 -0.019
Service, not elsewhere classified 0.152 0.086 0.068 0.064 -0.003 0.012 0.039 0.027 0.040 0.046
1992 2002
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manufacture of chemicals at quantile 0.9 were 0.215 in 1992 and 0.588 in 2002 for 
male workers, but they were 0.041 in 1992 and 0.269 in 2002 for female workers. 
On the other hand, the wage penalties of retail trade at quantile 0.1 were -0.121 in 
1992 and -0.141 in 2002 for males and 0.045 in 1992 and -0.009 in 2002 for females. 
The wage penalties of hospitality and food service at quantile 0.1 were -0.144 in 
1992 and -0.135 in 2002 for males and 0.162 in 1992 and -0.035 in 2002 for 
females.  
The third finding is that, among male workers at the top end of the 
distribution, industry wage premiums and penalties tended to increase between 
1992 and 2002, and inter-industry wage differentials seemed to increase. For 
example, the wage premium of manufacture of chemicals at quantile 0.9 was 0.215 
in 1992, but it became 0.588 in 2002. Also, the wage premium of electricity, gas, 
heat, and water supply was 0.662 in 1992, but it was 1.317 in 2002. On the other 
hand, the wage penalties of manufacture of textiles at quantile 0.9 were -0.184 in 
1992 and -0.363 in 2002. Those of manufacture of wooden products were -0.128 in 
1992 and -0.222 in 2002. 
Finally, among female workers at the bottom and top ends of the distribution, 
industry wage premiums and penalties tended to decrease between 1992 and 2002, 
and inter-industry wage differentials seemed to decrease. For example, the wage 
premiums of the steel industry at quantile 0.1 were 0.188 in 1992 and -0.012 in 
2002. Those of manufacture of machinery and equipment were 0.158 in 1992 and 
0.018 in 2002. On the other hand, the wage premiums of finance and insurance at 
quantile 0.9 were 0.327 in 1992 and 0.087 in 2002. Those of real estate were 0.171 
in 1992 and 0.082 in 2002. Also, the wage penalties of retail trade at quantile 0.9 
were -0.196 in 1992 and -0.077 in 2002. 
Next, we calculate the weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) to 
summarize the overall variability in industry wages (Figure 1). The WASD is a 
measure developed by Krueger and Summers (1988) and has been used previously 
(Katz & Summers, 1989; Tachibanaki & Ota, 1992). This measure considers the 
numbers of employees in each industry and the upwardly biased estimate of the 
standard deviation of coefficients. We use coefficients obtained from the UQR 
models to see whether inter-industry wage differences differ across the wage 
distribution. We calculate the WASD using coefficients at nine quantiles dividing 
the wage distribution into equal groups. 
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Figure 1. Inter-Industry Wage Differentials Measured by the Weighted Adjusted 
Standard Deviation (WASD) 
 
The result displayed in Figure 1 underscores the changing pattern of industry 
wage premiums as discussed above. According to Figure 1, inter-industry wage 
differentials are greater at the top end of the distribution, especially for male 
workers. Furthermore, inter-industry wage differentials tend to have increased 
between 1992 and 2002 for males at the top end of the distribution. For female 
workers, inter-industry wage differentials decreased at almost every quantile 
except for quantile 0.6.  
In sum, our analyses indicate that there are substantial inter-industry wage 
differentials, especially among male workers at the top end of the wage 
distribution, and these wage differences increased for males between 1992 and 
2002. Compared to males, inter-industry wage differentials are not so great for 
female workers, and they decreased between 1992 and 2002. 
This suggests that there are structural processes of distributing wages to 
employees, which are not explained by the competitive labor market model. 
Specifically, these results indicate the possibility that economic environments 
faced by firms in each industry are important for employees’ wages, and these 
environmental advantages generate profits, which are then shared by workers. 
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In the next subsection, we identify the factors determining wage differences 
between industries. 
Analysis 2: Determinants of inter-industry Wage Differentials 
We estimate the URQ model using the following industry-level variables: the 
HI, labor productivity (LPROD), and union density (UNION), instead of dummy 
variable for industry in Model (1). Model (2) is presented as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑦; 𝑄𝜏) = 𝛽[𝜏]0 +∑𝛽[𝜏]𝑗𝑋
𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝜒[𝜏]𝐻𝐼 + 𝜆[𝜏]𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 + 𝜇[𝜏]𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝜀[𝜏]𝑖 
･･･Model (2) 
 
The coefficients of these three industry-level variables at nine quantiles 
obtained from Model (2) are displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the following 
four findings. First, except for the effect of HI for male workers in 1992, both HI 
and the labor productivity have significant positive effects on wages, especially at 
the top end of the distribution. This suggests that an industry’s high market 
concentration and high labor productivity increase wages of employees, and these 
industry wage premiums are shared by employees at the top end of the 
distribution. We also find that this rent-sharing occurred through mechanisms 
other than workers’ collective bargaining because the coefficients of the HI and 
productivity remain significant after controlling for union density. 
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HI 
 
Labor productivity 
 
Union density 
 
Figure 2. Coefficients of Industry-Level Variables on Wages 
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Second, union density has a significant effect on wages, but the directions of 
the effects differ between males and females. For male workers, union density has 
significant positive effects at almost all quantiles except for a negative effect at the 
top end of the distribution in 1992. This means that male employees in industries 
with high union density are paid higher wages. On the other hand, union density 
tends to have negative effects at each quantile for female workers. This means 
that unions do not help female workers earn higher wages. Also, we note that the 
effects of union density changed for female workers between 1992 and 2002. Union 
density had positive effects at top end of the distribution in 1992, but it had 
negative effects in 2002. 
Contrary to these results for union density, we note clearer changing patterns 
of the effects of the HI and labor productivity. Thus, our third finding is that the 
effects of the HI increased between 1992 and 2002, especially at the top end of the 
distribution. The coefficient changed significantly at quantile 0.9 for male workers. 
In 2002, the coefficient of the HI at quantile 0.9 was 0.00059. This means that, for 
example, the wage of male workers in the electricity, gas, heat, and water supply 
industry (HI = 1098.91) was 1.9 times higher than that of male workers in retail 
trade (HI = 3.23) at quantile 0.9 in 2002. On the other hand, the effect of the HI 
was negative and stayed between -0.0001 and 0 in 1992. This negative effect 
means that working in industries with high market concentrations was not 
advantageous for male workers in 1992. However, considering a model that 
includes only the HI as the industry-level independent variable, the effect of the 
HI was significant and positive in 1992 as well as in 2002. The effect of the HI was 
negative in the model including both HI and labor productivity in 1992. This 
means that male workers in industries with high market concentrations were paid 
higher, but this was because these industries were more productive. 
Finally, we find that the effects of labor productivity on wages decreased, 
especially at the top end of the distribution between 1992 and 2002. In 1992, the 
coefficient of labor productivity at quantile 0.9 was 0.00046 for male workers. This 
means that the wage of male workers in electricity, gas, heat, and water supply 
(LPROD = 2845) was 3.0 times higher than that of male workers in retail trade 
(LPROD = 454) at quantile 0.9 in 1992. However, this high wage advantage 
decreased between 1992 and 2002. In 2002, the coefficient at quantile 0.9 was 
0.00017, which means that the estimated wage advantage of male workers in the 
electricity, gas, heat, and water supply industry was 1.6 times higher than that of 
male workers in retail trade. 
 
Discussion 
In sum, the analysis in the previous section reveals the following three 
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findings. First, there are substantial inter-industry wage differentials, especially 
among male workers at the top end of the wage distribution, and these wage 
differentials increased between 1992 and 2002. Compared to male workers, wage 
differences between industries among female workers did not vary across the wage 
distribution, and these inter-industry wage differentials decreased between 1992 
and 2002. Second, market concentration (HI), labor productivity, and union 
density tended to have significant and positive effects on wages at different 
quantiles except for the negative effect of union density on wages for female 
workers. Also, the effects of market concentration and labor productivity tended to 
be greater at the top end of the wage distribution. Third, the effects of market 
concentration on wages increased, whereas the effects of labor productivity 
decreased between 1992 and 2002, especially at the top end of the distribution. 
We discuss these findings in the next subsection, focusing on economic 
segmentation and rent-sharing as explanations for inter-industry wage 
differentials. After examining these two processes, we discuss the changing trends 
during the 1990s. 
Economic Segmentation and Rent-sharing as Explanations for Inter-industry 
Wage Differentials 
The results suggest that there are structural processes of distributing wages 
to employees, namely, economic segmentation and rent-sharing, in the labor 
market. In terms of economic segmentation, we found that industries’ high market 
concentrations and labor productivity are related to higher wages of both male and 
female employees. These results demonstrate that firms in different industries 
deal with different economic environments to conduct their business, and the 
environmental advantages pertaining to each industry generate profits, which 
become sources of high wages for the employees in these industries. Although 
there are some changing trends, as discussed below, the positive effects of these 
two factors on wages basically remained unchanged during the 1990s. 
In terms of rent-sharing, we observe the following two findings. First, 
industries’ high union density is related to high wages for male workers.10) This 
suggests that rent-sharing is prompted by workers’ great bargaining power. 
However, the effects differ between genders. Union density had negative effects at 
most quantiles for female workers except for its positive effect at the top end of the 
wage distribution in 1992. This fact could reflect the Japanese collective 
bargaining system that typically represents the interests of full-time male workers. 
In Japan, unions are mostly formed within firms. Therefore, it is said that unions 
maintain a cooperative attitude towards employers. This is possible because 
unions focus on representing a specific group of employees, namely, full-time male 
workers. In 1992, union density had positive effects for females at the top end of 
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the distribution, which means that high union density was advantageous for only 
a small portion of female workers. However, this positive effect disappeared in 
2002, and furthermore, high union density was related to lower wages for female 
workers. This suggests that a union might sacrifice the interests of female workers 
to increase male workers’ wages. 
The second finding is that rent-sharing is not completely determined by 
workers’ bargaining power. Market concentration and labor productivity, which 
measure economic segmentation, have substantial effects on wages even after 
controlling for union density. Previous studies suggest that employers could share 
industry rents with their employees for a number of reasons, such as reducing 
resignations and turnover, decreasing incentives to shirk work, and/or raising the 
average quality of the workforce (Genrea et al., 2011). Although it is difficult to 
directly observe such (often unwritten) contracts between employers and 
employees, our results show that such an agreement to share industry rents 
between employers and workers may, in fact, exist. The following result 
supplements this argument: industry wage premiums are shared, especially by 
male workers located at the top end of the distribution. This also means that in 
high wage industries, wage inequality within industries is higher among male 
workers. Accordingly, we would argue that employers in high wage industries 
treat male workers differently and implement wage differentials among them to 
provide employees incentives. 
Changes in the Economic Segmentation Structure during the 1990s 
As discussed above, these employment strategies in high wage industries 
could be feasible because of economic segmentation. However, our results show 
that the source for higher wages, in other words, the structure of economic 
segmentation, changed during the 1990s. Between 1992 and 2002, the effect of 
market concentration on wages increased, whereas the effect of labor productivity 
decreased. 
Why, then, did these changes take place during the 1990s? First, in terms of 
the effect of labor productivity on wages, in 1992, firms in profitable industries 
could afford to pay higher wages to employees, and the fruits of labor were 
distributed to workers, especially those at the top end of the distribution. However, 
by 2002, the effect of labor productivity on wages had decreased. This might reflect 
a change in employment strategies adopted by firms. According to Noda and Abe 
(2010), labor share has shown a downward trend since the mid-1990s in Japan, 
and this decreasing trend emerged when firms increased productivity. The authors 
also indicated that wage level varies depending on how firms raise financing, and 
wages are set to lower levels at firms that rely on the capital market to raise these 
funds. Since the 1990s, many firms have changed their way of raising funds, and 
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therefore, firms’ profits might have gone to stockholders and internal reserve and 
not to employees. We argue that because of these changes, firms in profitable 
industries also might have stopped paying higher wages to employees. 
Next, we discuss why the effect of domestic market concentration on wages 
increased during the 1990s. The first point to note here is that every company 
faces severe competition in domestic and internal markets. Many companies try to 
cut labor costs, and companies even in highly profitable industries may not share 
their profits with their workers. However, companies in oligopolistic industries 
could afford to pay higher wages to workers because of the following reason: 
competitive environments would change very quickly, influencing firms’ profits. 
Thus, it has become difficult for firms to predict future profits. On the other hand, 
firms in industries with high domestic market concentration could anticipate 
future profits more easily than firms in other industries. We suggest that this is 
one reason why domestic market concentration is highly advantageous for 
workers. 
Interestingly, these changes in the structure of economic segmentation caused 
different changes in the patterns of inter-industry wage differentials between 
genders: inter-industry wage differentials increased for male workers and 
decreased for female workers during the 1990s. 
In considering these differences it is useful to reflect on some recent studies 
on the American labor market that have reported that inter-industry wage 
differentials have decreased since the 1990s. Kim and Sakamoto (2008) 
interpreted this result as suggesting that firms no longer pass on a portion of their 
rents to broad groups of workers. Morgan and Tang (2007) explained the 
decreasing trend in inter-industry wage differentials by arguing that it is because 
people at the bottom of the class structure have been disproportionately harmed 
by changes in employment relations. We found a similar trend among females but 
not among males in Japan.  
Our results reveal that the effect of labor productivity on wages decreased for 
females more considerably than for males at the bottom end and center of the 
wage distribution. On the other hand, the effect of market concentration on wages 
increased for male workers more substantially than female workers. Workers’ 
bargaining power measured by high union density did not help female workers 
earn higher wages. We conclude that firms no longer pass on a portion of their 
rents especially to female workers. These changing trends generated rent 
destruction for female workers and rent rising for male workers between 1992 and 
2002. 
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Conclusion 
This paper examined how inter-industry wage differentials changed during 
the 1990s in Japan using UQR analysis and the Employment Status Survey. We 
also utilized industry-level variables (the HI, labor productivity, and union 
density) to examine whether and in what way inter-industry wage differentials 
are explained by two structural processes of distributing wages, namely, economic 
segmentation and rent-sharing. 
We found that inter-industry wage differentials and the relationship between 
industry-level variables and wages vary across the wage distribution. Specifically, 
inter-industry wage differentials tend to be greater at the top end of the 
distribution, especially for male workers, and changes during the 1990s took place 
at the top end of distribution. Accordingly, we argue that it is important to focus on 
different points in the wage distribution to study wage inequality. If we focus only 
on one representative value, such as the mean or median, we might overlook 
substantial inter-industry wage differentials and changing trends. 
Our results also underline the importance of noncompetitive explanations for 
inter-industry wage differentials. There were substantial inter-industry wage 
differentials after controlling for workforce characteristics, and all of our 
industry-level variables showed significant effects on wages.  
However, our analysis suffers from several limitations. First, information 
about firms is not available in our data. Although we discussed that there might 
be contracts causing rent-sharing between employers and employees, we could not 
actually observe what happens in firms. Many recent studies have used employer–
employee matching data to show evidence of rent-sharing (Arai, 2003; Du Caju et 
al., 2011; Gannon et al., 2007; Guertzgena, 2010; Lundin & Yun, 2009). It is 
effective to use this kind of data to address questions about structural processes of 
distributing wages. Second, our data were sourced from a cross-sectional survey. 
Therefore, we could neither control unobserved workers’ characteristics nor 
examine whether the observed industry wage premiums reflected unobserved 
workers’ characteristics such as ability. It is important to consider possible 
selection biases that could influence worker allocation to specific industries. 
Finally, as our industry-level variables were limited, we might have overlooked 
other important industry-level variables.11) 
To conclude, we demonstrated substantial inter-industry wage differentials 
during the 1990s. In the future, we plan to examine the structural processes of 
distributing wages using recent data with rich information about workers, firms, 
and industries. 
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Notes 
1) According to Ota (2005), the Basic Survey on Wage Structure covers only 45 
percent of male employees. 
2) Baron and Bielby (1984) asserted that industry-based specifications of 
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economic segmentation are not appropriate. However, the existence of 
inter-industry wage differentials shows that industry type is an important 
factor that determines the wage distribution. 
3) Unlike Moran and Tang (2007), we do not use the class category to examine 
selective rent destruction because class category is not available in our 
data. 
4) Our data are provided by the National Statistics Center. The data are 
processed to improve anonymity. The respondents are randomly resampled 
using 80 percent of the original response data. Unusual households, such 
as households with more than eight people or households with more than 
three people of the same age, are deleted to prevent them from being 
identified. 
5) The variable of hourly wage is calculated using the variables of annual 
wage and weekly working hours, which are originally categorical variables. 
These categorical variables are transformed into continuous variables 
using the median of each category. Because the exact continuous values of 
wage and working hours are not available, there might be some 
measurement errors. 
6) We estimate the Gini coefficient and find that overall wage inequality 
increased between 1992 and 2002 for males (Gini: 0.0412→0.0446). On the 
other hand, wage inequality was almost stable for females (Gini: 
0.0450→0.0448). 
7) We do not include the variable of capital–labor intensity in our model 
because capital–labor intensity is highly correlated with labor productivity. 
8) The industrial classifications of the three surveys used for industry-level 
variables do not correspond directly to our classifications. For example, we 
have one category for “electricity, gas, heat, and water supply” in the 
Employment Status Survey, but the JIP database has one category each for 
these industries. Where there are more than two categories in the JIP 
database and only one category in our data, we use the average value of 
these corresponding categories. Also, as no category corresponds to “service, 
not elsewhere classified” in the JIP database, we use the average values of 
all service industries for the category. The industrial classifications of the 
Financial Statements of Corporations are broader than those of the 
Employment Status Survey. For example, as the value for the railroad 
industry is not available in the Financial Statements of Corporations, we 
substitute the value of the transport industry for the railroad industry. Also, 
as data for the food service industry are not available, we use the value of 
the hospitality industry. As we cannot obtain a value for the financial and 
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insurance industry, we substitute the value for this industry with the 
corresponding value from the Basic Survey on Business Activity. As the 
values for medical and health, and education, are available for 2004 only, 
we use the value of 2004 for our 1992 and 2002 data. 
9) However, the wage penalties of the forestry and fishery industries are 
significant for female workers. This might be because there are only a few 
female employees in these industries, and sampling errors might be greater 
for these two industries than for other industries. 
10) In 1992, union density had a negative effect at the top end of the 
distribution for male workers. This is understandable given the fact that 
unions could play a role in compressing wage inequality within each 
workplace, and thus, high union density could lead to smaller wage 
inequality within industries. For example, Firpo et al. (2009) showed that 
the effects of union membership on wages are negative at the top end of the 
distribution in the United States. However, our result shows that unions no 
longer had such an effect in 2002. 
11) Some previous studies showed that intensity of global competition is also 
an important factor affecting wage differences between industries. Lundin 
and Yun (2009) demonstrated that industries facing intensive import 
competition from low-income countries have lower wage premiums. 
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